Is the federal government doing enough to ensure airline safety? Unfortunately, the answer is no.

The industry has worked very hard to establish a safety culture, but today there are dangerous trends that threaten to jeopardize that culture and the safety of the millions of Americans who fly every day.

These trends are evident given the recent controversies involving the grounding of 300 American Airlines MD-80s and 40 Southwest Airlines jets due to inspection discrepancies; the prior FAA-sanctioned operation of Southwest aircraft past due on inspections; and the grounding of six United Airlines 747s after the discover of faulty test equipment at a foreign maintenance plant.

Clearly, something is wrong with the Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS), the current "trust and verify" non-punitive oversight structure of the FAA.

There should be concern that the system is producing required data. Since airlines handle submission of information, this in effect gives them the role of self-auditor, usually not the ideal oversight framework.

When ATOS was formulated, routine on-site inspections and spot checks were designed to mitigate this risk, but even while the FAA was promoting "trust and verify," it was deeply cutting its inspector ranks; particularly troubling, given the huge jump in maintenance outsourcing (64 percent of airline maintenance budgets in 2006) and resulting problems, as seen in the United Airlines case.

Facts mishandled, ignored
 

Even if the system is producing facts, these facts can be ignored or mishandled. This appears to be the case with Southwest, when it disclosed its jets missed inspections but continued to allow them to operate, all with the apparent knowledge of an FAA supervisor.

A system may produce the data necessary to evaluate safety, but inadequate numbers of personnel can prevent this evaluation from taking place. The FAA's recent announcement of a special review of only 10 percent of applicable directives is a tacit recognition of the inability of staffing levels to meet inspection and data review needs. This review's recent discovery of possible wiring issues with American Airlines MD-80s is evidence that such major issues would not have been discovered under normal ATOS procedures.

The FAA has long faced criticism that it is too familiar and friendly with the airline industry. Supervisors have limited investigations, settled cases, held up proposed rule-making, or reduced fines for airlines; in some cases, justifying these reductions due to particular airlines' financial hardship.

ATOS is not necessarily a bad system, but is overstretched and subject to a too-close relationship with the industry.

I support Rep. Jim Oberstar, D-Minn., chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, along with Reps. John Duncan, R-Tenn., and Steve Cohen, D-Tenn., in their call for hearings and a comprehensive review of the FAA.

Transparency and oversight are the foundation upon which a true safety culture is built. We must continue to stay vigilant to ensure that our safety culture, which has produced the safest aviation transportation system in the world, endures.

Jim Hall was chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board 1994-2001. He now heads Hall & Associates LLC, a transportation safety and security consulting and government relations firm.