The
June
22
Metro
accident
that
killed
nine
people
and
injured
80
has
left
questions
unanswered.
However,
even
before
the
National
Transportation
Safety
Board
determines
a
probable
cause
for
this
accident,
two
things
are
clear
from
the
initial
facts:
In
the
face
of
limited
resources,
the
Washington
Metropolitan
Area
Transit
Authority
ignored
crucial
NTSB
recommendations,
prioritizing
savings
over
safety;
and,
more
important,
the
lack
of
federal
oversight
allowed
this
dangerous
prioritization
to
occur.
Metro's
budgetary
woes
are
well
known.
Soon
after
the
accident,
WMATA
officials
pointed
to
the
agency's
tight
budget,
throwing
up
their
hands
and
deflecting
blame.
Yet
more
funds
would
not
have
addressed
the
inadequate
safety
culture
at
WMATA.
Although
the
agency
successfully
addressed
20
recommendations
that
the
NTSB
made
after
a
similar
1996
accident,
the
replacement
of
older
cars,
which
was
recommended
after
an
accident
in
2004,
was
deemed
too
expensive.
Phasing
out
the
cars
ahead
of
schedule
would
cost
upward
of
$1
billion,
which
WMATA
said
it
could
not
afford.
Nonetheless,
the
agency
had
other
options.
In
lieu
of a
recall,
older
cars
should
have
been
slated
to
follow
stricter
operating
procedures,
such
as
being
placed
between
newer,
safer
cars
or
following
different
speed
and
distance
guidelines
--
measures
now
being
implemented.
Additional
training
could
have
been
provided
to
employees
operating
these
cars.
Minimally,
given
the
known
risk
of
"telescoping,"
WMATA
should
have
retrofitted
these
cars
with
anti-climbers,
devices
to
ensure
that
in a
collision
one
car
does
not
climb
onto
another.
As a
last
resort,
WMATA
should
have
raised
fares
to
offset
the
cost
of
the
phaseout,
prioritizing
the
safe
transit
of
passengers
over
cost
and
convenience.
Sadly,
the
agency's
inaction
was
predictable.
It
is
unlikely
that
WMATA
ignored
NTSB
recommendations
because
it
was
indifferent
to
passenger
safety.
Rather,
the
agency
probably
viewed
the
chance
of a
severe
accident
as
small
enough
to
obviate
the
need
for
serious
action.
This
tendency
to
underestimate
risk
in
cost-benefit
calculations
is
not
unique
to
WMATA,
and
it
dictates
the
need
for
federal
safety
standards.
WMATA
operates
with
essentially
no
federal
oversight,
despite
its
reliance
on
federal
funding
for
nearly
half
of
its
capital
improvement
costs.
In
addition
to
the
direct
federal
investment
of
$260
million
in
formula
grants
and
discretionary
funds,
the
federal
government
provides
thousands
of
its
employees
with
reduced
or
free
fares,
essentially
a
federal
subsidy
of
Metro.
On
top
of
these
regular
sources
of
federal
funding,
Congress
has
appropriated
$34
million
for
Metro
to
purchase
new
rail
cars.
Yet,
the
Federal
Transit
Administration
is
little
more
than
a
grant-authorizing
organization,
lacking
the
authority
to
set
or
enforce
standards.
While
the
agency
conducts
"voluntary
safety
audits"
and
publishes
guidelines
and
recommendations,
it
lacks
the
teeth
that
agencies
such
as
the
Federal
Aviation
Administration
and
the
Federal
Railroad
Administration
have.
As a
result,
the
FTA
takes
a
hands-off
approach
to
safety,
delegating
oversight
to
state
and
local
authorities
and
spending
a
mere
0.11
percent
of
its
budget
on
safety
(compared
with
the
44
percent
of
the
FAA
budget
devoted
annually
to
safety
oversight).
That
an
agency
with
an
annual
budget
of
$10.3
billion
does
not
have
authority
to
set
safety
standards
is
troubling.
The
NTSB's
recommendations
to
WMATA
mean
little
if
the
federal
agency
providing
funds
for
Metro
lacks
the
power
to
make
the
recommendations
compulsory.
Rather
than
letting
it
remain
an
appropriating
mechanism,
Congress
should
give
the
FTA
the
jurisdiction
to
enact
and
enforce
federal
safety
standards
applicable
to
all
transit
systems.
Modeled
after
the
FAA,
the
FTA
could
then
use
lessons
learned
from
each
accident
nationally.
A
system
of
uniform
regulations
is
critical
to
preventing
continued
operation
of a
tombstone
transit
system,
whereby
local
improvements
are
made
only
after
a
tragedy
has
occurred.
The
writer
was
chairman
of
the
National
Transportation
Safety
Board
from
1994
to
2001.
He
is
managing
partner
of
Hall
&
Associates
LLC,
a
crisis
management
and
government
relations
firm.
