Independent Pilots Association Flight Times: One Level of Safety for All Pilots
By: Jim Hall, Former Chairman of the NTSB (1994-2001)
Now more than ever, in the post-9/11 world, we need to maintain one level of safety for all pilots. The world of cargo transportation faces a growing number safety risks, especially as cargo becomes larger and more diversified. In fact, many of these new risks are outside of pilots' control. Fortunately, their emergence is accompanied by new innovative methods of combating them. Clever, effective, and cheaper safety measures are presenting themselves on many fronts, and much progress has been made in implementing them into the industry. Recent events, however, have shown that there is much more to be done and that, often, neither the FAA nor the industry go far enough in requiring safety precautions that could significantly reduce the risks associated with cargo aircraft transportation.
The most recent development in this area has been the issue of fuel tank inerting. Fuel tank inerting treats the highly flammable fuel/air mixture that exists in every fuel tank but are especially prevalent in those which are closer to empty. It attempts to reduce flammability by replacing the fuel/air mixture with air that has a higher nitrogen content, which reduces flammability. While in the past most safety precautions pertaining to fuel tank explosion risks have aimed at reducing ignition sources, the FAA has decided that inerting the vapors that do exist is another effective route at averting explosion risk. Specifically, due to four fairly recent accidents that were caused by fuel tank explosion (one of them ignited by a terrorist's bomb), the FAA recently released a Notice for Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would amend the current regulations to require that transport aircraft include some form of fuel tank inerting mechanism, either flammability reduction means (FRM) or ignition mitigation means (IMM).
While this is a good first step towards the goal of eliminating as best we can the risk of fuel tank explosion, the FAA decided that fuel tank inerting should only be required of transport airplanes. They believe that because cargo planes have less flight hours and fewer passengers the safety measure is not justified by a cost/benefit analysis.
In response to this, IPA has taken action. Answering to the FAA's NPRM, the IPA pointed out several reasons why fuel tank inerting systems should be required on cargo aircraft. First and foremost, the FAA's decision to exclude airplanes used in all cargo operations puts pilots of those airplanes in greater danger than those of transport airplanes. Also, aircraft used in freight operations have a higher average age, which in itself increases the likelihood of an accident. Moreover, even planes that are new are subject to AD 2002-19-52, which restricts center pump usage due to flammability-ignition source issues. This action clearly shows that fuel tank flammability is as much of a concern for cargo planes as it is for transport aircraft. It is interesting to note also that the authors of the NPRM explicitly contradict themselves by stating that they “believe all occupants should be protected against those designs that present a risk, serious injury or death” while seeming to have less regard for the safety of cargo pilots and those on the ground.
The NTSB's support of retrofitting cargo planes stems from the risk associated with cargo planes using airports in densely populated areas. The FAA does not seem to take this into account in their cost/benefit analysis. Also, the IPA pointed out that the recent accident involving the Air Force C-5A Galaxy Aircraft shows that nitrogen based inerting systems can prevent explosion and death. The military's use of these systems is a testament to their belief in the importance of fuel tank inerting systems.
In response to the NPRM, FedEx and UPS made docket submissions which express their support of the exclusion of cargo planes from the requirement. UPS states in their argument that the conclusion that crashes are less likely with all cargo planes means that “no appreciable safety benefit would be gained by including cargo aircraft into this proposed rule.” Also, FedEx argues that the FAA overestimates the probability of a fuel tank explosion because it includes in its analysis those accidents that were caused by terrorist attacks (specifically Avianca Flight 203). They state “this accident was the result of a terrorist's bomb and this should not be included any more than the accidents that were caused by lightning or engine failures.”
Both of these industry arguments ignore what should be their primary concern, that being an equal level of safety for their pilots as is required for transport carrier aircraft. These arguments also ignore the common carriage of dangerous goods and hazardous materials by cargo aircraft. In addition, a recent case in the US Ninth District Court of Appeals ( San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission ) dealt specifically with the FedEx argument. In this case regarding a nuclear power plant in California , the court ruled that terrorist attacks are a real danger that cannot simply be ignored in cost/benefit analyses. In many ways, this case is analogous to the FAA's situation, and thus calls for an assessment of the risks associated with a terrorist attack.
We should continue our efforts to encourage the FAA to require FRM or IMM on all-cargo planes as well as transport planes, and in light of the Ninth District Court's ruling, I believe they should conduct another cost/benefit analysis.
Unfortunately, this is not the only situation in which the FAA holds a double standard for transport and cargo aircraft. Other examples are the regulations dealing with Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF). The current regulation (14 CFR Parts 121, 139) holds transport aircraft (or at least ones that carry more than 31 people) to a higher standard, requiring them to have more ARFF personnel and resources on call. Although a cargo plane may outweigh a transport plane significantly, the resources allocated to emergency prevention through ARFF are significantly less. Because they are allotted fewer resources to fight an emergency, pilots of these planes are clearly in greater danger than those of transport planes. And again, I emphasize, unlike the majority of risks during flight, this one is completely out of the pilot's control.
One front on which progress has been made is that of cargo screening and security. Recently, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) tripled the amount of cargo subject to screening. Also, over 100,000 employees who deal with cargo on the ground and in the air will be required to have background checks. These represent substantial efforts to reduce risks associated with cargo transportations. Still, tighter regulations are needed. And while progress has been made, worries about cost have prevented the TSA from enacting all the regulations necessary to cargo plane safety. Interestingly enough, it has been shown that these cost concerns may not be well-founded. For example, the TSA has attempted to deploy explosives detection systems, but their implementation has been hampered by inadequate planning and funding strategies. However, a cost/benefit analysis of these systems being installed at 9 airports shows that in the long run they could produce substantial government savings. This is just one example of how inefficient practices and short-sightedness have adversely affected aircraft safety.
Other factors specific to cargo aircraft can give rise to safety problems. As I mentioned earlier, the average age of a cargo airplane is significantly higher than that of a transport plane. However, one even more important difference is the frequency that cargo planes carry hazardous materials or so-called “dangerous goods” (Hazmat/DG). Cargo planes transport these materials much more often than do passenger planes—and in greater quantities—and thus experience higher risk, including that of a terrorist attack. While there are regulations from the Department of Transportation and the FAA, these are minimal. Unfortunately, UPS follows these regulations as opposed to implementing measures of its own to provide its employees with greater safety. I firmly believe that stronger regulations are required in this area, and if they do not come from the government, then UPS can and should take it upon itself to go above and beyond in order to provide its pilots with the safest working environment possible.
While these risks may seem quite diverse, they have one important factor in common: the pilot, no matter how competent or cautious, has little or no control over them. Therefore, the responsibility for minimizing or preventing these risks must fall elsewhere. I firmly believe that through heightened government regulation and greater support from UPS, we can significantly reduce the risks aforementioned. I fully support the IPA and commend its efforts towards achieving this end. Its pilots deserve nothing less.
Monday, June 19, 2006
